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POLICE CULTURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
A CRITIQUE OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE’S
FINAL REPORT
Julian A. Cook, III∗
[A] lot of our work is going to involve local police chiefs, local
elected officials, states recognizing that the moment is now for us
to make these changes. We have a great opportunity, coming out
of some great conflict and tragedy, to really transform how we
think about community law enforcement relations so that
everybody feels safer and our law enforcement officers feel, rather
than being embattled, feel fully supported.
—President Barack Obama 1
In response to a series of events involving police-citizen encounters,
including those in Ferguson, Missouri, and Staten Island, New York, that
have strained relations between law enforcement and the communities
(primarily minority) that they serve, President Barack Obama established a
task force charged with developing a set of recommendations designed to
improve police practices and enhance public trust. 2 Headed by Charles
Ramsey, Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, and Laurie
Robinson, former Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Justice Programs, and currently a Professor of
Criminology, Law, and Society at George Mason University, 3 the elevenmember task force submitted its documented recommendations in May
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1 Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President After Meeting with
Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/03/02/remarks-president-after-meeting-task-force-21st-century-policing.
2 Exec. Order No. 13,684, 3 C.F.R. 312 (2014).
3 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 81 (2015) [hereinafter Report].
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2015. In a report entitled the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing (the Report), the task force sets forth in excess of
sixty recommendations, which address, among other things: building
community trust, police policies, employment of technologies, officer
training, and officer wellness and safety. 4
The Report suggests that effective policing and improved community
relations can be achieved through redirected police policies, enhanced
communication with—and involvement of—local communities in public
safety matters, as well as improved and sensitized law enforcement
training. 5 Rather than engage in a comprehensive examination of the
Report’s proposals, this Essay will address an important theme highlighted
by the task force—the importance of reforming police culture—and explain
why the well-intentioned recommendations proffered in the report
associated with addressing cultural change will face substantial hurdles to
successful implementation.
I.

REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

The Report correctly identifies police culture as a principal underlying
cause for the strained relations existent between the police and many local
communities. It observes that while police investigative practices have
become increasingly effective, the public’s confidence in the police has
either “remained flat” or, particularly in minority communities, has
declined. 6 Recognizing that obedience to the law increases when a

Id. at i.
See id. at 1–4. The Report has also generated criticism. E.g., Stephen Dinan &
Ben Wolfgang, Obama Seeks to End Immigration Enforcement by Local, State Police,
WASHINGTON
TIMES
(May
18,
2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/18/obama-seeks-to-end-immigrationenforcement-by-loca/?page=all (arguing that the Report’s recommendation that the federal
government “decouple” itself from state and local law enforcement authorities in
immigration enforcement is misplaced); Stuart Schrader, The Liberal Solution to Police
Violence: Restoring Trust Will Ensure More Obedience, THE INDYPENDENT (June 30, 2015)
https://indypendent.org/2015/06/30/liberal-solution-police-violence-restoring-trust-willensure-more-obedience (arguing that the Report’s recommendations will ultimately enhance
police powers, and that it pays too little attention to the disparity among white and minority
communities regarding perceptions of police legitimacy); Alex S. Vitale, Obama’s Police
Reforms Ignore the Most Important Cause of Police Misconduct, THE NATION (Mar. 6,
2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/obamas-police-reforms-ignore-most-importantcause-police-misconduct/ (arguing that that the task force paid insufficient attention to
structural realities which work to maintain racial inequality and failed to recommend a
redirection from alleged harmful police priorities, such as the war on drugs and “broken
windows” police practices).
6 Report, supra note 3, at 9.
4
5
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community supports the legitimacy of those employed to enforce it, 7 the
Report identifies four procedural prerequisites to achieving this objective:
(1) extending dignity and respect to individuals; (2) allowing individuals
the opportunity to express themselves during encounters; (3) decision
making that is fair and transparent; and (4) conveying motives that the
public deems to be “trustworthy.” 8
To this end, the Report proffers several recommendations designed to
improve the culture of policing. The recommendations, which are
distributed throughout the ninety-nine page report and are contained in five
of the six principal topical areas (or “pillars”) identified in the document,
focus overwhelmingly upon police practices and procedures. For example,
the task force suggests that law enforcement “embrace a guardian mindset
to build public trust and legitimacy,” and that it adopt internal and external
procedural polices consistent with this approach. 9 The Report also
recommends that police departments become more transparent with respect
to their policies, as well as their data reflecting detentions, arrests, and
other demographic information. 10 It further suggests that law enforcement
agencies develop policies regarding the employment of force that are “clear
[and] concise,” that are available for public review,11 and that emphasize
the exercise of restraint in appropriate circumstances. 12
The Report also urges the adoption of community policing policies,
which emphasize positive, collaborative relationships between the police
and various community members and groups. 13 It states that the
“infus[ion]” of a community policing approach “throughout the culture and
organizational structure of law enforcement agencies” would help
“transform culture within the police department as well as in the
community.” 14 Significant emphasis is also placed upon training and
education, which the Report declares is the “starting point for changing the
culture of policing.” 15 Finally, the Report delineates an array of measures
that it suggests would promote officer wellness and safety. Referencing
testimony by Dr. Alexander Eastman during one of the seven “listening
sessions” sponsored by the task force, the Report notes that the

Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11 (Recommendation 1.1).
Id. at 13 (Action Item 1.3.1).
Id. at 20 (Recommendation 2.2).
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 41–42.
Id. at 43 (Recommendation 4.2).
Id. at 53 (Recommendation 5.1). The task force recommends a more active federal
involvement in local and state training initiatives. Id. at 53–60.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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transformation of police organizational culture is “the most important
factor to consider when discussing [officer] wellness and safety.” 16
Individually and collectively, the proffered police organizational
reforms are laudable objectives. Embracing a guardian mindset, increasing
law enforcement policy and practice transparency, adopting community
policing practices, and improving officer training and education are
reasoned approaches to the issue of police malfeasance. The problem,
however, has less to do with the proffered recommendations than with the
incentives on the part of the police to pursue such goals and to retain any
successes that are achieved. Without more, successful implementation and
permanence of the proffered recommendations are dependent, in large part,
upon the initiative and good faith of law enforcement entities across the
country. Some departments with problematic cultures might refuse to
implement corrective measures. Others might take corrective action with
vigor. Yet, even the most willing actor must have sufficient motivation to
maintain its successes.
II.

SUPREME COURT INFLUENCES

Unfortunately, there exists a heavy wave of influences that run counter
to successful organizational reforms. Chief among them are the steady and
powerful signals that have been consistently delivered to law enforcement
agencies from the Supreme Court since the close of the Warren Court era in
1969. The Warren Court was characterized, in large part, by its
comparatively liberal construction of individual constitutional safeguards.
It was during this period that the Court rendered the historic Miranda v.
Arizona decision, which afforded individuals in police custody the right to
be informed of their rights to counsel and to remain silent prior to the
commencement of interrogation, 17 that the right to counsel was extended to
individuals charged with felonies 18 and to certain forms of out-of-court
identification procedures, 19 and that a privacy safeguard was recognized in
telephonic conversations that occur outside the home. 20
And it was the Warren Court that decided Mapp v. Ohio, 21 the
landmark case which extended the reach of the exclusionary rule to the
states. In general terms, the exclusionary rule provides that, in the event of
a Fourth Amendment breach, the derivative evidence cannot be used at
trial. In language that was forceful and clear, the Court found that the rule
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 62.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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of exclusion was a constitutional mandate.22 It unequivocally considered
the exclusionary component an “essential part of the right to privacy.” 23 A
different interpretation, the Court explained, would render the safeguards
against unreasonable searches and seizures a guarantee in word only. 24 The
Court reasoned that it was “logically and constitutionally necessary” to
extend this mandate to the states in order to give substance to the
constitutional guarantees, to incentivize the government to respect these
safeguards, and to prevent prosecutorial forum shopping. 25 Yet, during the
post–Warren Court era the Court has steadily, and significantly, departed
from Mapp.
No longer considered part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment, the
rule of exclusion is now viewed by a majority of the Court as a remedy of
“last resort.” 26 It is a remedy that is applied only when appreciable
deterrence to purposeful, reckless, or grossly negligent police misconduct
can be achieved. 27 Though the exclusionary rule as a principle remains
intact, various exceptions to the rule have developed which together have
significantly circumscribed the circumstances under which a claimant can
avail himself of exclusion. 28 Unquestionably, the most notable exception
has been the “good faith” rule, which has operated to exclude Fourth
Amendment violations in instances where the police have acted in good
faith reliance upon their authorization to conduct a search. 29 By any
measure, the exclusionary rule is now a shell of its former self.
In addition, the landscape of individuals eligible to pursue
constitutional challenges to police conduct has narrowed significantly since
the Warren Court. Consider that in 1960, the Supreme Court in Jones v.

22 Id. at 655 (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”).
23 Id. at 656.
24 Id. at 655.
25 Id. at 655–58.
26 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).
27 Id. at 144.
28 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (the independent source
doctrine); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (the inevitable discovery doctrine); Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (the attenuated circumstances doctrine).
29 E.g. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (officer reasonably relied on a “negligent
bookkeeping error by another police employee”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)
(officer reasonably relied on court clerk’s determination, later found to be erroneous, that
the defendant had an outstanding warrant for arrest); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)
(in conducting a warrantless administrative search, officer reasonably relied upon a state
statute later found to be unconstitutional); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(officer reasonably relied upon a search warrant later found to be lacking in probable cause).
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United States 30 identified four possible bases upon which standing to
pursue a constitutional challenge could be established: (1) legitimate
presence on the premises of a search; (2) establishment of a privacy
interest; (3) a possessory interest in the evidence searched or seized; or (4)
being a target of a government search. 31 Of the four, only the privacy test
remains, and it represents the predominant standard through which standing
can be established. 32 The privacy test threshold requires an infringement
upon a claimant’s personal Fourth Amendment protections and does not
recognize the assertion of third-party claims. 33
The Court’s diminishment of the right of exclusion and its meaningful
narrowing of the class of eligible claimants conveys a powerful signal to
law enforcement—not to mention society in general—that the
constitutional misdeeds of the police will frequently be overlooked.
Simultaneously, the Court conveys that individual constitutional safeguards
are not fully guaranteed. As a result, police organizations become
emboldened by their expanded investigative latitude, and an aggressive
culture of policing is often an accompanying byproduct. No doubt, police
work is dangerous, unpredictable, reactive, and riddled with risks. 34 A
seemingly innocent encounter can become violent or even deadly with little
or no notice. Yet police practices that are overly aggressive can fragment a
police-community relationship and destroy the trust necessary for an
effectual coexistence.
How to tame aggressive and unconstitutional police practices within
the context of effective policing is the ultimate question. It is, however,
unrealistic to expect meaningful and sustained cultural change absent
sufficient incentives. The reforms detailed in the Report are directed
primarily at police organizations and are dependent upon the initiatives of
state and local agencies.
But goodwill alone will produce little
measureable benefit unless accompanied by legislative or judicial mandates
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
See id. at 261, 263–67.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Rakas is part of a series of cases in which
the Court substantially narrowed the range of individuals capable of pursuing constitutional
challenges. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1980) (finding that “a
prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the seized
good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal
contradiction”); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (despite owning the narcotics
discovered during a search by law enforcement officers, defendant lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of that search); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734
(1980) (stating that the Court’s precedents “do not command the exclusion of evidence in
every case of illegality [by law enforcement officials]”).
33 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137–38.
34 See Report, supra note 3, at 61–62 (describing the “physical, mental, and emotional
injuries [that] plague many law enforcement agencies”).
30
31
32
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that penalize police misdeeds. The police are not going to relinquish
investigative authority granted by the Supreme Court through voluntary
election.
Indeed, a few proffered reforms recommend that the police ignore
longstanding Supreme Court precedent. One such proposal suggests that
“[l]aw enforcement officers should be required to seek consent before a
search and explain that a person has the right to refuse consent when there
is no warrant or probable cause.” 35 But in 1973, the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 36 held “that knowledge of a right to refuse is not
a prerequisite of a voluntary consent.” 37
And another proposal
recommends that “[l]aw enforcement agencies and municipalities . . .
refrain from . . . initiat[ing] investigative contacts with citizens for reasons
not directly related to improving public safety, such as generating
revenue.” 38 Yet the Supreme Court has plainly granted law enforcement
plenary authority to approach and follow individuals irrespective of the
officer’s underlying motivation, and this unrestrained freedom exists up
until the moment that a seizure occurs within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 39
The answer to the problem of twenty-first century policing is no doubt
complex. There is no silver-bullet answer. But the ultimate solution must
include a reversal of much of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the
exclusionary rule context. The diminishment of the right to exclusion has
helped foster the problem of aggressive policing, and a reinvigoration of
this principle would help reverse this trend. And the natural place to start is
by expanding the base of individuals eligible to challenge unconstitutional
police practices. A meaningful expansion of this base, in particular the
allowance of third-party standing, will not only allow for more widespread
challenges to unconstitutional and aggressive police behaviors, but also
incentivize police organizations to adapt to this new environment. An
expanded landscape of challengers to their practices will motivate police
organizations to alter their culture and engage in more constitutionally
compliant behaviors. Persistent challenges to police organization practices,
coupled with strictly enforced exclusionary rules, are among the big sticks
that can help effectuate the changes sought in the Report.

Report, supra note 3, at 27 (Recommendation 2.10).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at 234.
Report, supra note 3, at 26 (Recommendation 2.9).
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983) (plurality opinion) (first citing
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n.12 (1979); then citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 31, 32–33 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring); and then citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J.,
concurring)).
35
36
37
38
39
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Notably, third-party standing is currently authorized in the criminal
sphere in the context of jury selection. The Supreme Court in Batson v.
Kentucky 40 held that a prosecutor violated the equal protection rights of a
black defendant when he exercised his peremptory challenges to exclude
potential black jurors. 41 But it was the Court’s decision in Powers v.
Ohio 42 that allowed for third-party enforcement of the Batson principle. In
Powers, the Court held that a white defendant had third-party standing to
assert the equal protection rights of the jurors who were wrongly excluded
during jury selection. 43 In reaching this result, the Court reasoned, inter
alia, that the defendant would be sufficiently motivated to pursue the equal
protection rights of the excluded members of the venire, and that the latter
group would be insufficiently motivated to seek legal redress. 44
The same rationales apply with equal force in the Fourth Amendment
context. Defendants are aggrieved by unconstitutional police behaviors
when evidence obtained as a byproduct of such actions is introduced
against them at trial. Whether obtained in violation of their personal
privacy protections or those of someone else, the injury and the motivation
to seek vindication of the constitutional infringement is quite significant.
When confronted with the prospect of a criminal conviction and possible
incarceration, defendants become highly motivated actors to exclude
evidence that can produce such undesirable outcomes. For the criminal
defendant, it is immaterial whether the Fourth Amendment protections that
have been violated belong to the defendant or a third-party. The impetus to
exclude remains the same.
And like the wrongly stricken juror, the uncharged individual
victimized by unconstitutional police behavior is highly unlikely to pursue
a legal remedy. Structural barriers, such as qualified immunity, which
largely shields law enforcement personnel from individual liability, 45 and
the Eleventh Amendment, which protects the states against civil damages
actions, 46 serve as meaningful disincentives to the pursuit of legal redress.
In addition, there are practical barriers. Distrust of the legal system,
particularly in minority communities, and access to lawyers willing to

476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 89.
499 U.S. 400 (1991).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 411, 414–15.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (officers receive qualified
immunity for their actions so long as they do not violate clearly established laws or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have been aware).
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
40
41
42
43
44
45
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assume a civil action against the police are notable impediments.47
Furthermore, individuals aggrieved by unconstitutional government
conduct are less likely than the juror populations at issue in the Powers line
of cases to pursue legal action on account of financial hardships, childcare
difficulties, and misgivings regarding the fairness of the criminal judicial
process. 48
CONCLUSION
The spate of disturbing police-citizen contacts that have recently
generated significant media attention has prompted renewed attention upon
the propriety of police practices, particularly in minority communities. The
comprehensive reforms set forth in the Report certainly provide a useful
platform from which this discussion can take place. Yet meaningful reform
is dependent less upon the establishment of task forces, the development of
innovative ideas, and the art of persuasive argumentation than upon
legislative and judicial dictates that mandate change. The Supreme Court’s
steady and significant diminishment of individual safeguards since the
close of the Warren Court era—including the exclusionary rule and the
related concept of standing—has contributed to a police organizational
culture that has manifested itself in aggressive and unconstitutional
behaviors that have seemingly become more pronounced in recent years.
However, a robust exclusionary rule, coupled with a vastly expanded
landscape of eligible challengers to police practices, can help effectuate a
beneficial change in police culture and officer behavior on the ground. It is
this sort of change—meaningful access to the enforcement arm of the
judiciary, and the court’s liberal authority to wield that influence—that are
necessary prerequisites to consequential reform.
And until these
prerequisites are satisfied, I submit that it is doubtful that transformative
change in police culture will occur.

47 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS, 69–70 (2012) (arguing, inter alia, that many individuals—minorities in
particular—who are victimized by police misconduct are unlikely to pursue legal action out
of fear of police harassment and retaliation and distrust of the legal process).
48 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through
Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (1999) (noting that jury
populations tend to underrepresent minority groups and that the community of non-jurors is,
inter alia, more likely than juror populations to have financial resource and child care
difficulties, English proficiency issues, and apathy toward the judicial process).

